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Abstract
This thesis explores an application of a con-resistant trust mechanism to improve the
performance of communications-based special protection systems to further enhance their
effectiveness and resiliency. New initiatives in the energy sector are paving the way for the
emergent communications-based smart grid technology. Smart grids incorporate modern
information technologies in an effort to be more reliable and efficient. However, with the
benefits of this new technology comes added risk associated with threats and
vulnerabilities of the technology as well as to critical infrastructure it supports. This
research utilizes a con-resistant trust mechanism as a method to quickly identify malicious
or malfunctioning (untrusted) protection system nodes in order to mitigate the resulting
instabilities in the smart grid. The con-resistant trust mechanism enables protection system
agent nodes to make trust assessments based off of the cooperative and defective behaviors
the nodes exhibit. These behaviors are directly related to the frequency level each node
reports during each time step. Nodes that are cooperating are given positive interaction
trust values. Nodes that are defecting are given negative interaction trust values.
The feasibility and performance of this trust architecture is demonstrated through
experiments comparing a simulated special protection system implemented with a
con-resistant trust mechanism and without via an analysis of variance statistical model.
The simulations yield positive results when implementing the con-resistant trust
mechanism within the special protection system for the smart grid.
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An Application of Con-Resistant Trust to Improve the Reliability of
Special Protection Systems within the Smart Grid
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Threats of terrorist attacks and natural disasters highlight the importance of
protecting, securing, and understanding the interdependencies of the nation’s critical
infrastructure (CI). Protecting and ensuring the continuity of critical infrastructure of the
United States are essential to the nation’s security, public health and safety, economic
vitality and way of life [1]. Presidential directives have identified eighteen highly
interconnected critical infrastructure key resource sectors, each of which depend on
another to operate and function properly. Increasingly interconnected systems are
vulnerable to threats brought on by sector dependence with the potential to trigger
interrelated, cascading disturbances that can directly and indirectly affect the other
infrastructures, impact geographic regions, and send ripples throughout the national and
global economy [2], [3], [4].
The Energy sector in particular is highly depended upon by other sectors. This sector
is responsible for the electrical power generation, transmission, and distribution of
electrical power to customers. As the population of the United States grows, so does the
demand for electrical power as well as the stress applied to the already antiquated power
grid. Furthermore, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are the
control systems used to monitor, operate, and control sensitive processes and physical
functions of the power grid. Today’s SCADA systems have been around for several
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decades. They have evolved over the past 50 years from standalone, compartmentalized
operations that were not concerned about security into intricately networked architectures
that communicate across large distances [5]. These architectures have been upgraded to
incorporate advanced information technology (IT) to improve overall process efficiency,
productivity, and safety; however, security was never adequately addressed. While the
basic architecture and design of the North American power grid and SCADA systems
have remained relatively the same over the years, it is not sufficient to meet the power
demands of the future [6], [7].
Recent initiatives promise to modernize the power grid for efficiency and reliability
as well as to meet the increasing power demands of America’s future by implementing
smart grid technologies [7]. Implementation of the smart grid technologies require the
deployment of new technologies and multiple interconnected communication
infrastructures. Efforts to modernize the grid, sometimes on top of legacy systems, have
created a highly vulnerable power grid infrastructure that is susceptible to many threats
and vulnerabilities [8].
Special protection systems (SPS) detect system disturbances in the power grid and
take predetermined actions to counteract the condition in a controlled manner [9]. Large
system disturbances, such as transient instabilities, require an immediate response from
the protection system in order to prevent cascading power outages. The special protection
system response to system disturbances created by malfunctioning or malicious entities is
what motivates this research.
1.2 Research Focus
Previous research experimented with implementing a context-specific
reputation-based trust mechanism as a means to improve the special protection system
decision making process in the presence of failures and disruptions attributed to
malfunctioning or malicious smart grid components. This research is focused on
2
implementing a different trust mechanism within a special protection system to improve
the reliability and efficiency of the smart grid. The primary goal of this research is to
demonstrate that a special protection system implemented with a con-resistant trust
mechanism can successfully function in the presence of untrusted (malicious or
malfunctioning) smart grid special protection system nodes. The con-resistant trust
mechanism will implement appropriate load shedding strategies to mitigate transient
instabilities that can occur. It is expected that the following investigative questions will be
answered:
• Does a special protection system implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism
successfully determine and execute the appropriate load shedding strategy during
system wide disturbances in the presence of untrusted (malicious or malfunctioning)
agent nodes?
• Does a special protection system implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism
successfully keep the system’s steady frequency above the 58.8 Hertz (Hz)
threshold?
• Can a special protection system implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism
perform at least as well as previous research with reputation-based trust
mechanisms?
1.3 Organization
This chapter provided a brief introduction to Critical Infrastructure, Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, the Smart Grid and Special Protection
Systems (SPSs). Additionally, the chapter introduces the focus and primary goal of this
research. The remainder of this document is organized as follows:
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• Chapter 2 provides the background and literature review of the information required
to give a complete understanding of the research effort.
• Chapter 3 introduces the goals and hypothesis of the research effort. It also includes
the methodology and approach to obtaining the research goals.
• Chapter 4 presents and analyzes the results from the research experiments.
• Chapter 5 summarizes the entire research effort and provides recommendations for
future work.
4
2 Literature Review
2.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief background on information relevant
to the proposed research area. First, a review of critical infrastructure and key resources
(CIKR), their associated sectors, and the importance of understanding sector
interdependencies. Next, the chapter provides an overview of the electrical power grid to
include relevant governance and the three major functions of the grid. Then, the chapter
provides a brief introduction to industrial control systems (ICS) to include distributed
control system (DCS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
Additionally, the chapter discusses the evolution and the general layout of SCADA
systems. Next, the chapter provides an overview of the smart grid and related concepts.
The chapter then presents the security issues and challenges associated with SCADA
systems and the smart grid. Furthermore, the chapter gives a brief description of special
protection systems (SPS), their purpose, and some of their limitations. Finally, the chapter
provides an overview of trust, reputation-based trust models, and trust models used in
previous research.
2.2 Critical Infrastructure
Since the early 1980’s there have been several definitions of the term infrastructure.
These definitions were often broad and left open to interpretation that focused primarily
on the nation’s public works and the services they provide rather than protecting them
[10], [11]. It was not until 1998 when President Clinton signed Presidential Decision
Directive-63 (PDD-63) that a focus was placed on identifying and protecting critical
infrastructure (CI) assets at the national level.
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PDD-63 mostly defines critical infrastructure as those physical and cyber-based
systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government [12]. This
directive identified eight critical infrastructure sectors to include banking and finance,
emergency law enforcement services, emergency services, energy, information and
communications, public health services, transportation, and water supply [12]. However,
in direct response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States
Congress published the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act that more
thoroughly defined critical infrastructure as the:
Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination of those matters [13].
A little over a year later, President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002
into law that established the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This Act
introduced the term key resources (KR) and defines them as publicly or privately
controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government
[14].
In December 2003, President Bush issued the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-7 (HSPD-7) which superseded PDD-63 and established a national policy for
federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and to
protect them from terrorist attacks [15]. This directive expanded the critical infrastructure
sectors to include key resources and brought the total number of sectors to 17. Four years
later, these critical infrastructure key resource (CIKR) sectors were redefined in the 2007
National Strategy for Homeland Security. Furthermore, HSPD-7 authorized DHS to
identify gaps in existing critical infrastructure sectors and establish new sectors to fill the
gaps as needed [15]. As a result, the DHS identified Critical Manufacturing as a gap and
6
added it the CIKR list in March of 2008 bringing the total number of CIKR sectors to 18.
Table 2.1 shows a current listing of the CIKR sectors.
Table 2.1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Key Resources (CI/KR) [15], [16]
CIKR Sector Description
Agriculture & Food Ensures the safety and security of food, animal feed, and food-
producing animals; coordinates animal and plant disease and pest 
response; and provides nutritional assistance.
Banking & Finance Provides the financial infrastructure of the nation.
Chemical Transforms natural raw materials into commonly used products 
benefiting society’s health, safety, and productivity.
Commercial Facilities Includes prominent commercial centers, office buildings, sports 
stadiums, theme parks, and other sites where large numbers of people 
congregate to pursue business activities, conduct personal commercial 
transactions, or enjoy recreational pastimes.
Nuclear Reactors, Materials 
& Waste
Provides nuclear power.
Dams Manages water retention structures that are major components of other 
critical infrastructures that provide electricity and water.
Defense Industrial Base Supplies the military with the means to protect the nation by producing 
weapons, aircraft, and ships and providing essential services, including 
information technology and supply and maintenance.
Drinking Water & Water 
Treatment Systems
Provides sources of safe drinking water from community water 
systems and properly treated wastewater from publicly owned 
treatment works.
Emergency Services Saves lives and property from accidents and disasters.
Energy Provides the electric power used by all sectors and the refining, 
storage, and distribution of oil and gas. The sector is divided into 
electricity, oil, and natural gas.
Government Facilities Ensures continuity of functions for facilities owned and leased by the 
government, including all federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal 
government facilities located in the U.S. and abroad.
Information Technology Produces information technology and includes hardware 
manufacturers, software developers, and service providers, as well as 
the Internet as a key resource.
National Monuments & 
Icons
Maintains monuments, physical structures, objects, or geographical 
sites that are widely recognized to represent important national 
cultural, religious, historical, or political significance.
Postal & Shipping Delivers private and commercial letters, packages, and bulk assets.
Public Health & Healthcare Mitigates the risk of disasters and attacks and also provides recovery 
assistance if an attack occurs. This sector consists of health 
departments, clinics, and hospitals.
Telecommunications Provides wired, wireless, and satellite communications to meet the 
needs of businesses and governments
Transportation Systems Enables movement of people and assets that are vital to our economy, 
mobility, and security with the use of aviation, ships, rail, pipelines, 
highways, trucks, buses, and mass transit.
Critical Manufacturing Transforms materials into finished goods.
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Critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) sectors are not independent and rely
on one another in order to operate and function properly. What happens in one CIKR
sector can directly and indirectly affect other CIKR sectors, impact large geographic
regions, and send ripples throughout the national and global economy [2]. Certain sectors,
such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, and drinking water and water
treatment systems, are considered ”lifeline systems” that are essential for national and
economic security as well as public health and safety [11]. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary
defines lifeline as something regarded as indispensable for maintaining or protection of
life [17]. The concept of ”lifeline system” was developed to evaluate performance of
large, geographically dispersed CIKR networks during natural disasters such as
earthquakes and hurricanes [11]. Although the potential for natural disaster to occur
always exists, the lifeline concept should also evaluate performance of CIKR networks
during equipment failures and malicious attacks.
2.2.1 Sector Interdependencies. During the last half of the century, technical
innovations and developments in information technology and telecommunications
dramatically increased interdependencies among the nation’s critical infrastructure [18].
America has become an open, technologically sophisticated, highly interconnected, and
complex nation with a wide array of critical infrastructure that spans important aspects of
the U.S. [19]. Increasingly interconnected systems are vulnerable to threats brought on by
sector dependence with the potential to trigger interrelated, cascading disturbances that
can directly and indirectly affect the other infrastructures, impact geographic regions, and
send ripples throughout the national and global economy [2], [3], [4]. This vast and
diverse aggregation of highly interconnected assets, systems, and networks present an
attractive array of targets to domestic and international terrorists and greatly magnify the
potential for cascading failures in the wake of catastrophic natural or manmade disasters
[11], [20], [19].
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Figure 2.1 highlights some of the critical infrastructure sector interdependencies
across North America. Each sector relies on other sectors in order to function successfully.
For example, the energy sector, including the electric power industry, is of primary
importance because it provides the essential energy needed by other sectors to function.
Dependency: A linkage or connection between two infra-
structures, through which the state of one infrastructure in-
fluences or is correlated to the state of the other.
Fig. 2 illustrates the concept. Under normal operating
conditions, the electric power infrastructure requires natu-
ral gas and petroleum fuels for its generators, road and rail
transportation and pipelines to supply fuels to the genera-
tors, air transportation for aerial inspection of transmission
lines, water for cooling and emissions control, banking and
finance for fuel purchases and other financial services, and
telecommunications for e-commerce and for monitoring
system status and system control (i.e., supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and energy manage-
ment systems (EMSs)). During emergencies or after compo-
nent failures, the electric power infrastructure will have po-
tentially different yet critical dependencies on the same in-
frastructures. For example, the utility may require petro-
leum fuels for its emergency vehicles and emergency gener-
ators and road transportation (and in some cases rail and
air transportation) to dispatch repair crews and replace-
ment components.
As depicted in Fig. 2, electric power is the supported infra-
structure, and natural gas, oil, transportation, telecommu-
nications, water, and banking and finance are supporting in-
frastructures. Although not shown, emergency and govern-
ment services are also supporting infrastructures.
Interdependency
When examining the more general case of multiple infra-
structures connected as a “system of systems,” we must
consider interdependencies. Infrastructures are frequently
connected at multiple points through a wide variety of
mechanisms, such that a bidirectional relationship exists
between the states of any given pair of infrastructures; that
is, infrastructure i depends on j through some links, and j
likewise depends on i through other links:
Interdependency: A bidirectional rela-
tionship between two infrastructures
through which the state of each infrastruc-
ture influences or is correlated to the state
of the other. More generally, two infra-
structures are interdependent when each
is dependent on the other.
The term interdependencies is concep-
tually simple; it means the connections
among agents in different infrastructures
in a general system of systems. In practice,
however, interdependencies among infra-
structures dramatically increase the over-
all complexity of the “system of systems.”
Fig. 3 illustrates the interdependent rela-
tionship among several infrastructures.
These complex relationships are charac-
terized by multiple connections among in-
frastructures, feedback and feedforward
paths, and intricate, branching topologies. The connections
create an intricate web that, depending on the characteris-
tics of its linkages, can transmit shocks throughout broad
swaths of an economy and across multiple infrastructures.
It is clearly impossible to adequately analyze or understand
the behavior of a given infrastructure in isolation from the
environment or other infrastructures. Rather, we must con-
sider multiple interconnected infrastructures and their in-
terdependencies in a holistic manner. For this reason, we
use the term interdependencies rather than dependency
throughout the remainder of this article.
Dimensions of Infrastructure
Interdependencies
Using these concepts and definitions, we now explore the
six dimensions shown in Fig. 1. These dimensions and their
components are descriptive and are intended to facilitate
the identification, understanding, and analysis of interde-
pendencies. They do not represent a comprehensive set of
orthogonal interdependency metrics, although they pro-
vide a foundation for developing such metrics. As we will
discuss later, metrics and new modeling and simulation ap-
proaches are needed that can address, in a consistent man-
ner, all of these interrelated factors and system conditions.
Types of Interdependencies
Interdependencies vary widely, and each has its own charac-
teristics and effects on infrastructure agents. In the sections
that follow, we define and examine in detail four principal
classes of interdependencies: physical, cyber, geographic,
and logical. Although each has distinct characteristics, these
classes of interdependencies are not mutually exclusive.
Physical Interdependency
Two infrastructures are physically interdependent if the state
of each is dependent on the material output(s) of the other.
14 IEEE Control Systems Magazine December 2001
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Figure 2. Examples of electric power infrastructure dependencies.
Figure 2.1: Critical Infrastructure Sector Interdependencies [2]
Moder society has come to depend on reliable electricity as an essential resource for
national security; health and welfare; communications; finance; transportation; food and
water supply; heating, cooling, and lighting; computers and electronics; commercial
enterprise; etc. . . [3]. Coal and other fossil fuels are a major source of energy to generate
the electricity needed. In Figur 2.2, the burning of fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, and
petroleum) accounts for nearly 70% of the total electricity generated in the U.S. for 2011
[21]. The transportation systems sector and the oil and gas industries of the energy sector
are depended upon to get the coal to the elec ici y generating werpla ts to produce the
required electricity for consumers. Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical
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infrastructure key resource sector interdependencies is critical to the security, economic
prosperity, and social well-being of the nation [2].
Coal 42%
Natural Gas 25%
Nuclear 19%
Renewable 13%
Petroleum 1%
Figure 2.2: Sources of U.S. Electricity Generation in 2011 [21]
The interdependencies illustrated in Figure 2.1, clearly show how a disruption in one
infrastructure can directly lead to disturbances in other infrastructures. Furthermore, how
the infrastructures are interconnected can often extend or amplify the effects of a
disruption [18]. For example, the energy infrastructure interdependence is not isolated to
the United States. It crosses international borders to Canada and Mexico where oil and
natural gas pipelines and electrical transmission lines have helped integrate the energy
systems of North America [18]. Two prime examples highlighting the importance of
understanding sector interdependencies and Nation’s dependence on lifeline systems
include the 2003 Northeast power outage and 2005’s Hurricane Katrina.
On August 14, 2003, the northeastern portion of the U.S. and Canada experienced a
widespread blackout that affected over 50 million people and resulted in estimated
economic losses between 4 to 10 billion dollars [3], [22]. This significant event
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highlighted the nation’s dependence on electricity [3]. Among the multitude of causes
attributed to the blackout, the lack of situational awareness by the control area operators
and faulty process control system equipment that did not detect the instabilities in the
power grid due were primarily identified [3], [22].
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, damaging critical
infrastructure that disrupted governmental and business functions alike, producing
cascading effects that extended far beyond the physical reach of the storm [20].
Additionally, the effects caused by Hurricane Katrina highlighted the criticality of critical
infrastructure sector interdependencies [11]. For example, the supply of crude oil and the
refining of petroleum products were interrupted due to the loss of power at three major
transmission pipelines. This loss of power resulted in a loss of 1.4 million barrels of crude
oil and 160 million liters per day of gasoline production that accounted for 90 percent of
the production in the Gulf of Mexico and 10 percent of the U.S. supply respectively [11].
These real world examples underscore the vulnerabilities and interdependencies of
the Nation’s critical infrastructure. Protecting and ensuring the continuity of critical
infrastructure and key resources in the United States is essential to the Nation’s security,
public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life [19].
2.3 Electrical Power Grid
The North American power grid, commonly referred to as ”the grid”, is a complex
network of independently owned and operated infrastructures for delivering electricity
from suppliers to consumers. The grid has evolved into four distinct power grids or
interconnections. Three of which service the continental United States as seen in Figure
2.3. The Eastern Interconnection includes the eastern two-thirds of the U.S.. The Western
Interconnection includes the western one-third of the U.S.. The state of Texas has it’s own
Interconnection and is called the Electric Reliability Council of Texas.
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Figure 2.3: North American Power Grid Interconnections [18]
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is the governmental agency that
regulates the transmission of electricity between the major interconnections [23]. The
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is the self-regulating, non-profit
organization whose primary purpose is to improve and maintain grid reliability as well as
to develop and enforce reliability standards [24].
2.3.1 Governance. In 1968, NERC was established by the electric utility industry
for the purpose of developing and promoting voluntary compliance with rules and
protocols for the reliable operation of the electric power grid [24]. The U.S. Energy Policy
Act of 2005 authorized the creation of a self-regulatory ”electric reliability organization”
(ERO) that would span North America, with FERC providing oversight in the U.S. [25].
As a result, on July 20th, 2006, FERC certified NERC as the ERO for the United States
[24]. This gave NERC the authority to develop and enforce mandatory reliability
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standards. On June 18, 2007, compliance with these standards became mandatory and
enforceable in the U.S. [24].
Prior to being designated as the ERO for the U.S., NERC was appointed as the
electric utility industry’s primary point of contact with the U.S. government for national
security and critical infrastructure protection issues [24]. Under the authority of the ERO,
NERC developed Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) reliability standards to improve
the physical and cyber security of the Bulk Electric System. NERC generally defines the
Bulk Electric System as all electrical generation resources and transmission systems that
operate above 100 kV [26]. Table 2.2 summarizes the NERC CIP reliability standards.
Table 2.2: NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standards [27]
Number Title Summary
CIP-002 Critical Cyber Asset Identification Identify Critical Cyber Assets assoicated with Critical 
Assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk 
Electric System. 
CIP-003 Security Management Controls Responsive Entities must have minimum security 
management controls in place to protect Critical 
Cyber Assets. 
CIP-004 Personnel & Training Personnel having authorized cyber or authorized 
unescorted physical access to Critical Cyber Assets, 
are required to have an appropriate level of personnel 
risk assessment, training, and security awareness. 
CIP-005 Electronic Security Perimeter(s) Identify and protect the Electronic Security 
Perimeter(s) inside which all Critical Cyber Assets 
reside, as well as all access points on the perimeter. 
CIP-006 Physical Security of Critical Cyber 
Assets 
Ensure the implementation of physical security 
program for the protection of Critical Cyber Assets. 
CIP-007 Systems Security Management Responsible Entities are required to define methods, 
processes, and procedures for securing those systems 
determined to be Critical Cyber Assets, as well as 
other (non-critical) Cyber Assets within the Electronic 
Security Perimeter(s). 
CIP-008 Incident Reporting and Response 
Planning 
Ensure the identification, classification, response, and 
reporting of Cyber Security incidents related to 
Critical Cyber Assets. 
CIP-009 Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber 
Assets 
Ensure recovery plan(s) are put in place for Critical 
Cyber Assets and that these plans follow established 
business continuity and disaster recovery techniques 
and practices.
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These standards help ensure that all entities responsible for Bulk Electric Systems in
North America identify and protect critical cyber assets that control or could otherwise
impact the reliability of the Bulk Electric System [27]. A reliable Bulk Electric System
ensures the generation of electricity and delivering that electricity to the consumer. The
process of generating and delivering electricity to the consumer consists of three major
functions: 1) Electricity Generation, 2) Electric Power Transmission, and 3) Electricity
Distribution. An overview of the electric power system from generation to distribution to
the consumers can be seen in Figure 2.4.
2. Overview of the North American Electric Power
System and Its Reliability Organizations
The North American Power Grid
Is One Large, Interconnected
Machine
The North American electricity system is one of
the great engineering achievements of the past 100
years. This electricity infrastructure represents
more than $1 trillion (U.S.) in asset value, more
than 200,000 miles—or 320,000 kilometers (km)
of transmission lines operating at 230,000 volts
and greater, 950,000 megawatts of generating
capability, and nearly 3,500 utility organizations
serving well over 100 million customers and 283
million people.
Modern society has come to depend on reliable
electricity as an essential resource for national
security; health and welfare; communications;
finance; transportation; food and water supply;
heating, cooling, and lighting; computers and
electronics; commercial enterprise; and even
entertai ment and le sure—in short, early all
aspects of modern life. Customers have grown to
expect that electricity will almost always be avail-
able when needed at the flick of a switch. Most
customers have also experienced local outages
caused by a car hitting a power pole, a construc-
tion crew accidentally damaging a cable, or a
lightning storm. What is not expected is the occur-
rence of a massive outage on a calm, warm day.
Widespread electrical outages, such as the one
that occurred on August 14, 2003, are rare, but
they can happen if multiple reliability safeguards
break down.
Providing reliable electricity is an enormously
complex technical challenge, even on the most
routine of days. It involves real-time assessment,
control and coordination of electricity production
at thousands of generators, moving electricity
across an interconnected network of transmission
line , and ultimately delivering the el ctricity to
millions of customers by means of a distribution
network.
As shown in Figure 2.1, electricity is produced at
lower voltages (10,000 to 25,000 volts) at genera-
tors from various fuel sources, such as nuclear,
coal, oil, natural gas, hydro power, geothermal,
photovoltaic, etc. Some generators are owned by
the same electric utilities that serve the end-use
customer; some are owned by independent power
producers (IPPs); and others are owned by cus-
tomers themselves—p rticularly large industrial
customers.
Electricity from generators is “stepped up” to
higher voltages for transportation in bulk over
 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force  August 14th Blackout: Causes and Recommendations  5
Figure 2.1. Basic Structure of the Electric System
Figure 2.4: Overview of the Electric Power System [3]
2.3.2 Electricity Generation. The first major function, electricity generation, is the
process of generating electricity from other forms of energy such as water, wind, nuclear,
and fossil fuels. During electricity generation, maintaining a delicate balance between
supply and demand is crucial. Electricity that is generated travels at the speed of light and
cannot be stored in large quantities economically [18]. Therefore, the supply of electricity
must not exceed the demands of the consumer and should be transmitted the instant it is
produced.
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2.3.3 Electric Power Transmission. Electrical power transmission is the second
major function of the electric power grid and is responsible for the transfer of the
electrical energy from the transmission substations at the generating power plants to
electrical distribution substations over high voltage transmission lines [18]. These
transmission lines not only deliver electricity to the distribution substations, they also
connect the North American power grid interconnections.
2.3.4 Electricity Distribution. The final major function of the electric power grid
is electricity distribution where electrical power is delivered to the consumers. The high
voltage power that’s transferred over transmission lines is received at the electrical
distribution substations. Here, the high voltages are stepped down so that electricity can
be carried over distribution lines at lower usable voltages to customers.
Control centers contain sophisticated monitoring and control systems that are
responsible for balancing power generation and demand, monitoring the flows over
transmission lines, planning and configuring systems to operate reliably, maintaining
system stability, preparing for emergencies, and placing equipment in and out of service
for maintenance and during emergencies [18]. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Systems are the control systems distributed throughout the electrical power industry.
2.4 SCADA
Control systems are used throughout many infrastructures and industries to monitor,
operate, and control sensitive processes and physical functions [28]. Industrial Control
System (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems
including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Distributed
Control System (DCS) [29]. Distributed control systems are generally used to control
production systems confined within a local area such as a factory. SCADA systems are
highly distributed and are typically used in larger-scaled environments to control
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geographically dispersed assets where centralized data acquisition and control are critical
to system operation [22], [29]. These systems are found throughout many critical
infrastructure sectors in industries such as water distribution and wastewater collection
systems, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power grids, and railway transportation systems
[22].
2.4.1 Evolution of SCADA. SCADA systems have evolved over the past 50 years
from standalone, compartmentalized operations into intricately networked architectures
that communicate across large distances [5]. The first generation of computer-based
SCADA systems, introduced in the 1960s, employed a centralized architecture with a
powerful mainframe computer that was responsible for managing and performing all
functions [30]. These SCADA systems were independent, closed systems that consisted of
four basic components that included a central mainframe computer, remote terminal units
(RTUs), the wide area telecommunications system to connect them, and an operator
interface [30]. RTUs are field-based remote measurement and control units that are
continuously polled by the central computer to provide current measurement values. The
operator interface, also known as the Human Machine Interface (HMI), gave the human
operator access to the system through map board displays. Propriety communication
protocols were in use which gave the false sense of security to many SCADA system
owners and operators, thus security was not a big concern at the time.
Second generation SCADA systems emerged in the 1980s and proceeded through the
late 1990s. Advances in computing technology led to a more distributed SCADA
architecture in which multiple stations were networked together through the introduction
of local area networking (LAN) technologies [30]. This distributed architecture allowed
for various SCADA functions to be spread out amongst dedicated computers which
helped to improve overall SCADA system reliability. If one computer malfunctions then
only that specific function is lost vice the entire system. Communication protocols were
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still largely proprietary and security was still primarily an after thought. However, it was
this generation when SCADA security issues started to emerge.
Since SCADA systems are based on computer technology, their designs have evolved
in step with advances in computer technology [30]. The third and present generation of
SCADA systems have introduced advanced computer technologies and evolved into the
intricately network architectures that we know today. They are no longer the independent
closed systems but instead, they are open system architectures that are highly distributed
across wide area networks (WAN). The hardware devices and software protocols are no
longer completely proprietary. Even though some traditional information technology
security features have been implemented, the security of SCADA systems hasn’t been
able to keep up with emergent cyber security threats and vulnerabilities that exist today.
2.4.2 General SCADA Layout. Figure 2.5 shows the general system layout and
typical components that are found throughout modern SCADA systems. The control
center houses the Master Terminal Unit (MTU) or SCADA control server, the human
machine interface, communications routers, and other components that are all connected
by a local area network. MTUs communicate with one or more geographically distributed
field sites that house the remote terminal units, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs),
or Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). The field site’s basic functions are to gather
information from field devices, such as sensors or actuators, and send this information to
the MTU when instructed. Standard and proprietary communication protocols running
over serial communications are used to transport information between the control center
and field sites using telemetry techniques such as telephone line, cable, fiber, and radio
frequency such as broadcast, microwave and satellite [29].
While the basic architecture and design of the North American power grid and
SCADA systems have relatively remained the same over the years, it is not sufficient to
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The four basic architectures shown in Figure 2-3 can be further augmented using dedicated 
communication devices to manage communication exchange as well as message switching and buffering.  
Large SCADA systems, containing hundreds of RTUs, often employ sub-MTUs to alleviate the burden 
on the primary MTU.  This type of topology is shown in Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-5 shows an example of a SCADA system implementation.  This particular SCADA system 
consists of a primary control center and three field sites.  A second backup control center provides 
redundancy in the event of a primary control center malfunction.  Point-to-point connections are used for 
all control center to field site communications, with two connections using radio telemetry.  The third 
field site is local to the control center and uses the wide area network (WAN) for communications.  A 
regional control center resides above the primary control center for a higher level of supervisory control.  
The corporate network has access to all control centers through the WAN, and field sites can be accessed 
remotely for troubleshooting and maintenance operations.  The primary control center polls field devices 
for data at defined intervals (e.g., 5 seconds, 60 seconds) and can send new set points to a field device as 
required.  In addition to polling and issuing high-level commands, the SCADA server also watches for 
priority interrupts coming from field site alarm systems. 
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Figure 2.5: SCADA System General Layout [29]
meet the power demands of the future [6], [7]. A 2011 report by NERC predicts that, on
average, peak demand for electricity will increase by almost 12 percent by the year 2021
[31]. Significant improvement to the grid is necessary in order to meet future expected
demands.
2.5 S art Grid
Toda ’s lectrical power grid infrastructure in the U.S. is not up to the task of
powering America’s future and is rapidly running up against its limitations [32].
According to Carol Browner, director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate
Change from 2009 to 2011, ”We [the United States] have a very antiquated (electric grid)
system in our country . . . The current system is outdated, it’s dilapidated” [33]. In an effort
to modernize the grid for efficiency and reliability as well as to meet the increasing power
demands of America’s future, the Obama Administration awarded $3.4B for projects
implementing smart grid technologies [7].
While there is no established definition of a smart grid, the term smart grid generally
refers to developing network of transmission lines, equipment, controls, and new
technologies working together to respond immediate electricity demands of the 21st
Century [34]. It is a modern electric power grid that promises to improve efficiency,
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reliability, and safety through automated control and modern communications
technologies [35]. Ten specific capabilities that would be enabled by the emerging Smart
Grid are identified in the U.S. Energy Information and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. They
include the following [36]:
• Increase use of digital information and controls technology to improve the
reliability, security and efficiency of the electric grid;
• Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-security;
• Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including
renewable resources;
• Development and incorporation of demand-response, demand-side resources and
energy efficiency resources;
• Deployment of smart (real-time, automated, interactive) technologies that optimize
physical operation of appliances and consumer devices for metering,
communications concerning grid operations and status, and distribution automation;
• Integration of smart appliances and consumer devices;
• Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving
technologies including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal
storage air conditioning;
• Consumer access to timely information and control options;
• Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances and
equipment connected to the electric grid including the infrastructure serving the
grid; and
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• Identification and reduction of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to the adoption
of smart grid technologies, practices, and services.
Implementation of the smart grid characteristics listed above require the deployment
of new technologies and multiple interconnected communication infrastructures that are
highly susceptible to a myriad of vulnerabilities. With every new technology and easy
access to smart grid systems and data come new attack vectors that can be easily exploited
[7].
2.6 SCADA and Smart Grid Insecurities
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and networks were
generally thought to be secure because of their isolation from other networks. However,
the growing demands for increased connectivity have introduced vulnerabilities into the
grid that previously did not to exist. These SCADA architectures have been upgraded to
incorporate advanced information technologies (IT) to improve overall process efficiency,
productivity, and safety; however, security was never adequately addressed. Additionally,
the recent initiatives in the U.S. Energy Information and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 [36]
to modernize the grid with smart grid technologies, sometimes on top of legacy systems,
have created a highly vulnerable power grid infrastructure that is susceptible to many
threats and vulnerabilities [8].
In the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), a threat is defined a
natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the
potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property [19]. The
NIPP also defines a vulnerability as physical features or attributes that renders an entity
open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard [19]. Table 2.3 lists some general
threats and vulnerabilities that apply to SCADA systems and the emerging
communications-based smart grid.
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Table 2.3: General Threats and Vulnerabilities affecting SCADA systems and the Smart
Grid [37]
Threats Vulnerabilities
Naturally occurring events Communications
Untrained and/or distracted personnel The Internet
Insiders with malicious intent Grid complexity
Cyber-attack (lone actors) Grid control system complexity
Cyber-attack (terrorism) New systems
Cyber-attack (nation states) New Device
This list is not all inclusive and continues to grow causing tremendous concern about
the antiquated power grid as well as the emerging Smart Grid. Multiple efforts by private
sector entities and federal agencies to secure control systems and the grid are underway,
but challenges remain [38]. Critical infrastructure owners face technical and organization
challenges in securing their control systems. Technical challenges include legacy control
systems’ limited processing capabilities and real-time operations which make it difficult to
implement traditional information technology security technologies and best security
practices [38]. Additionally, organizational challenges include the lack of a compelling
business case to improve security and a reluctance to share information regarding security
incidents [38]. Often owners are willing to accept the risks associated with the insecurities
because of what it would cost to implement improved security measures. What is needed
are cost-effective measures to mitigate the risks associated with having insecure SCADA
systems and smart grid.
2.7 Special Protection Systems
Protections schemes, also known as protection systems, for the power grid are
primarily designed for improving power system stability or enhancing system security [9].
Power system stability is the property of a power system that enables it to remain in a state
of operating equilibrium under normal operating conditions and to regain an acceptable
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state of equilibrium after being subjected to a disturbance [39]. Special protection systems
(SPS) are protection systems designed to detect these system disturbances within the
power grid and take predetermined actions to counteract the condition in a controlled
manner, thus regaining an acceptable state of equilibrium [9]. Small system disturbances
occur frequently and typically do not require a protective system response. However, large
system disturbances, such as transient instabilities, always require immediate protection
system response in order to prevent complete system failure. Examples of large
disturbances that can cause transient instabilities in the power grid include [9]:
• Transmission faults
• Cascading outages of lines
• Generation outages
• Sudden, large load changes
• Combinations of the above
Failure to detect these system disturbances or respond in a timely manner could lead to
catastrophic events like the 2003 Northeast power outage [3] discussed previously in
Section 2.2.
Two examples of the most common types of special protection system schemes
include generation rejection and underfrequency load shedding [40]. Generation rejection
involves the selective tripping of generating units for severe transmission system
disturbances which has been used as a method of improving system stability for many
years [39]. The rejection of generation at an appropriate location in the system reduces
power to be transferred over the critical transmission interfaces [39]. Additionally, load
shedding schemes are employed to reduce the connected load to a level that can be safely
supplied by available generation [39].
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The use of smart grid technology makes it possible to improve legacy special
protection systems. The increased bandwidth capacity in the communications-based smart
grid will improve the systems’ context awareness and enables better protection system
decisions concerning detected system disturbances [41]. Trust, as it relates to computing
environments, is a mechanism that can take advantage of the increased bandwidth feature
in a communications-based smart grid to improve protection system decisions.
2.8 What is Trust?
Although the notion of trust has been extensively studied over the last half century
and is widely used throughout secure information systems, no formal definition of trust
truly exists [42], [43]. One definition of trust that is widely accepted came from Morton
Deutsch in 1962. It states that:
Trusting behavior occurs when an individual perceives an ambiguous path,
the result of which could be good or bad, and the occurrence of the good or
bad result is contingent on the actions of another person; finally, the bad
result is often more harming than the good result is beneficial. If the
individual chooses to go down that path, he can be said to have made a
trusting choice, if not, he is distrustful [44].
This definition provides the basic structure of making a trusting choice. An entity makes a
choice of which path to take based on the actions or reputation of another entity.
Reputation-based trust is found in many computing systems where trust is treated as a
binary concept [43]. A binary concept of trust is where an entity is either completely
trusted or completely untrusted. Complete trust requires absolute knowledge of an entity
which is often rare in real-world applications [43]. In contrast, completely distrusting an
entity can prohibit all communications with that entity potentially rendering the entity
useless.
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2.8.1 Reputation-Based Trust. Many different reputation-based trust models exist.
The foundation of this research builds off a context-specific reputation-based trust model.
In a context-specific reputation-based trust model, an entity (the truster) trusts another
entity (the trustee) with respect to a certain context [43], [45]. Here, context is
synonymous with service. Properties of trust within the context-specific trust model
include direct and indirect trust. Direct trust of an entity evolves from an entity’s direct
interaction experience with other entities and is kept for future interactions and providing
recommendations to other entities [45]. In this model the term interaction denotes an
action regarding a context or service. Indirect trust happens when there is no history of
direct interactions between two entities. In this case, recommendations from trusted peers
with direct interactions with the entity in question are considered [45].
2.8.2 Previous Research.
2.8.2.1 A Multi-Mechanism Trust Model. The Consolidated Trust
Management System (CTMS) developed by Mark Duncan in [46], is a trust management
system (TMS) that utilizes multiple trust mechanisms to make a single trust decision in
satellite telecommand networks. This framework is built off the work presented in [47]
where certain characteristics were taken into consideration for the development of CTMS.
These characteristics include [47]:
• Multiple Trust Mechanisms: Incorporate multiple trust mechanisms in concert for a
single trust decision regarding a complex trust relationship
• Open Nature: Define crucial trust relationships for known and unknown entities due
to the open nature of distributed information systems
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• Multiple Domains: Be aware of distributed information systems that span multiple
networks and cross multiple administrative and organizational boundaries that can
complicate trust relationships
• Real-Time Trust: Trust relationships in distributed information systems are dynamic
and must be evaluated and established in real-time
• Scalability: A trust management system implementation must be able to scale to
meet the maximum requirements of the distributed information system
• Complexity: The trust management system must be capable of modeling and
managing the complicated business functions and advanced technologies often
found in modern distributed information systems
The consolidated trust management system utilizes interaction and credential based
trust mechanisms to calculate a trust value for a given entity. As proposed by Yu and Singh
in [48], trust is determined through the number of positive interactions (cooperations) and
negative interactions (defections) an entity has with another. The basic premise behind the
trust calculation is that trust is easy to lose but hard to gain. For example, the level of trust
an entity has towards another entity can change based on the evaluation of an interaction.
If an entity perceives that another entity is cooperating during a specific interaction, its
trust in the other entity will increase. In contrast, if the entity perceives the other entity
had defected for a specific interaction, its trust in that entity will decrease.
Additionally, Duncan also incorporated the con-resistant trust model by Salehi-Abari
and White in [49]. This con-resistant trust model is an extension of the trust mechanism
proposed by Yu and Singh in [48]. A con-resistant trust model is one that is resistant to a
con-man or confidence-man attack. A confidence attack is based on a sequence of
interactions where a con-man entity conducts a series of consecutive cooperative
interactions in an attempt to gain the confidence of the system thus elevating its associated
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trust value. Then at a particular point in time, the con-man will defect, defrauding the
victim. The con-man then has two choices: 1) never interact with the victim again or 2)
regain the lost trust with subsequent cooperative behavior. The con-man, by regaining the
victim’s trust, can again con (or defect) the victim [49]. This research implements the
con-resistant trust model to improve the resiliency and the decision-making process of
special protection systems within the communications-based smart grid.
2.8.2.2 Reputation-Based Trust for Special Protection Systems. The
reputation-based Trust Management Toolkit (TMT) for the enhanced Special Protection
System (SPS) developed by Jose Fadul in [41] augments legacy power grid protection
system components to better utilize the increased bandwidth capacity in smart grids and
improves the decision making process in the presence of failures and disruptions
attributed to malfunctioning or malicious smart grid components. It utilizes
reputation-based trust values to improve smart grid protection system fault response times
and resiliency to intentional and unintentional protection component and communication
network errors [41]. The TMT consists of three major modules that calculate and assign a
trust value for a particular entity [41]:
• Trust Assignment Module - uses context sensitive information such as, frequency
information provided by individual smart grid components’ to determine trust values
• Fault Detection Module - uses error signals generated by frequency disturbance
monitoring devices to detect system frequency faults
• Decision Module - analyzes the current power grid conditions and assigned trust
values to decide on the most reliable corrective action that minimizes the risk of
failure to detect instabilities in the power grid
The reputation-based trust management toolkit utilizes a majority-rule algorithm where
trust values are assigned based on a concurrence of information received from multiple
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entities. The entities that agree with the trusted majority are trusted entities and the
entities that disagree with the trusted majority are untrusted. Furthermore, the trust
management toolkit also utilizes a greedy algorithm approach to determine which of the
trusted nodes are selected for load shedding.
Trust is calculated based on current context sensitive information and does not take
into account previous trust values. Hence, an entity might be completely trusted at one
time step and completely distrusted on the next time step. This complete distrust of an
entity at one point in time may not accurately represent the current state of the entity
rendering it useless potentially causing instability in the smart grid. What is needed is a
trust system that incorporates an entity’s previously assigned trust values to determine its
current trust value. Trust that is calculated from a historical perspective gives a more
realistic view of the special protection systems’ operational status.
2.9 Summary
This chapter presented the background information required for research with
implementing trust within special protection systems for a communications-based smart
grid. First, the chapter defined critical infrastructure and their respective sectors as well as
highlighted the importance of understanding critical infrastructure sector independencies.
Next, the chapter introduced the electrical power grid, it’s governance, and the three major
functions of the grid. Then, the chapter presented information on Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) control systems, the emerging communications-based smart
grid and their insecurities. Next, the chapter provided information on special protection
systems (SPS) and two of the most common types of SPSs. Finally, the chapter presents
information on trust, reputation-based trust models and trust used in previous research.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Overview
This chapter presents the methodology used to evaluate the application of a
con-resistant trust algorithm in a simulated special protections systems for the
communications-based smart grid. This con-resistant trust algorithm provides an
additional layer of security as well as improves the reliability of special protection system
during grid disturbances due to malfunctioning or malicious behaviors. The chapter
begins by describing the problem definition, research goals and hypothesis, and the
approach. Next, the simulation environment is discussed followed by a detailed
description of the research scenario to include the implementation of the con-resistant
trust mechanism, the interaction trust value calculation and the abuse case used.
Additionally, the metrics used to evaluate the performance of the con-resistant trust
mechanism are also discussed. Finally, the evaluation technique chosen and the
experimental design are covered along with the validation of determining the sampled data
are from a normally distributed population.
3.2 Problem Definition
3.2.1 Research Goals and Hypothesis. Legacy Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems and networks were generally thought to be secure because
of their isolation from other networks. However, the introduction of advance computing
technologies to improve reliability and functionality of SCADA systems and networks
have introduced vulnerabilities that previously did not exist. Furthermore, recent
initiatives proposed in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 [36] to
modernize the power grid with smart grid technologies, sometimes on top of the legacy
systems, have created a highly vulnerable power grid that is susceptible to numerous
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threats like the examples presented in Table 2.3 [8]. Additionally, these systems operate
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, making it difficult to implement the necessary security
patches to mitigate their vulnerabilities. Risks associated with these vulnerabilities
include critical system faults or line outages that can often result in cascading blackouts
like the Northeast Power Outage that occurred in 2003 [3]. These risks can be mitigated
through the implementation of additional security mechanisms, such as trust, that take into
account the strict timing constraints for electrical utility operations as well as the
responses to special protection system conditions. Table 3.1 summarizes the timing
constraints that must be met for SCADA and protection system responses [50].
Table 3.1: Time Constraints for Electric Utility Operations [51], [52], [53], [54]
Systems Situation Response Time
Routine power equipment signal 
measurement
Every 2-4 ms
< 4ms from event detection to sending 
notification [52]
4-40 ms automatic response time
Transient voltage instability Often < 180 ms to convey 14+ trip signals to 
disconnect generators at the top generating 
station [53]
Frequency instability, must 
respond faster than generator 
governors to trip generators 
instantaneously
Could require < 300 ms response time (by load 
shedding) for high rates of frequency decay; 
requires detection within 100 ms to allow 
operator response in 150 to 300 ms [53]
Dynamic instability A few seconds
Poorly damped or undamped 
oscillations
Several seconds
Voltage instability Up to a few minutes
Thermal overload Several minutes for severe overloads, rarely less 
than a few seconds for minor occurrences [53]
Emergency event notification < 6 ms
Routine transactions < 540 ms [54]
Routine HMI status polling from 
substation field devices
Every 2 secs
Substation IEDs; 
Primary short circuit 
protection and 
control
Local-area disturbance [51]
Backup protection 
and control; Wide 
area protection and 
control (WAPaC)
SCADA
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The primary goal of this research is to demonstrate that a special protection system
implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism can successfully function in the
presence of untrusted (malicious or malfunctioning) smart grid special protection system
nodes by implementing appropriate load shedding strategies to mitigate transient
instabilities that can occur. For the purposes of this research, the terms malfunctioning and
malicious nodes are synonymous and mean a node is exhibiting behavior outside of
normal operation. Additionally, a malfunctioning or malicious node is acknowledged as
an untrusted node. Nodes that are behaving within normal operations are acknowledged as
trusted nodes. It is hypothesized that assigning trust values based on the cooperative and
defective interactions between the load agent nodes in the simulated power grid will
improve the special protection system decision-making process of identifying and
selecting trusted nodes for load shedding.
3.2.2 Approach. Building off the reputation-based trust framework developed by
Fadul [41], this research utilizes an extension of the direct interaction trust model
developed by Yu and Singh [48] to detect malfunctioning behaviors during a special
protection system condition that requires immediate corrective responses to mitigate
instabilities within the smart grid. Corrective responses include actions, such as,
generation rejection or load shedding, that improve system stability [39].
Success is determined by the special protection systems ability to accurately identify
which load agent nodes are trusted and untrusted and its ability to select the minimum
number of optimal trusted nodes to shed load in an attempt to keep the systems
steady-state frequency above 58.8 Hz. Table 3.2 provides an example of how nodes are
sorted for load shedding. Nodes are sorted in order of precedence from left to right, first
by Node Type, then by whether or not the node is Trusted, next by the node’s Available
Load (MW) followed by the Authorized Shed Amount (MW) and Node ID. If the required
load shed amount is 875 MW of power, then the greedy algorithm would attempt to meet
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this requirement by selecting the first node (Node ID 25) in Table 3.2. If, Node ID 25 is
unable to satisfy the requirement, then the greedy algorithm will choose the next node
(Node ID 120). The greedy algorithm will continue down the table selecting nodes for
load shedding until the load shed amount of 875 MW is satisfied. In this example, the
minimum number of optimal trusted nodes for load shedding 875 MW of power is three,
namely Node IDs 25, 120, and 73.
Table 3.2: Sorted Nodes for Possible Load Shedding
Node 
Type Trusted
Available Load 
(MW)
Authorized Shed Amount 
(MW)
Node 
ID
Load Yes 1700 340 25
Load Yes 1607 321 120
Load Yes 1318 264 73
Load Yes 1098 220 72
Load Yes 1057 211 27
Load No 1026 205 74
Load No 320 64 75
Load No 97 19 70
The method used to calculate the Interaction Trust (I-Trust) value as proposed by Yu
and Singh is adapted to provide a quantitative measure of I-Trust for the nodes in the
system [48]. Furthermore, the direct interaction trust model is extended to include the
Con-Resistant trust model proposed by Salehi-Abari and White in [49]. A con-resistant
trust model is one that is resistant to a con-man or confidence-man attack. A confidence
attack is based on a sequence of interactions where a node conducts a series of
consecutive cooperative interactions in an attempt to gain the confidence of the system
thus elevating its associated trust value.
3.3 Simulation Environment
This research uses computer simulations to demonstrate a special protection system
implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism within the smart grid. The simulators
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in use are: 1) Power System Simulation for Engineering (PSS/E) [55], 2) the Network
Simulator 2 (NS2) [56] and 3) the Electric Power and Communications Synchronizing
Simulator (EPOCHS) [57].
PSS/E, developed by Siemen’s Corporation, is an electromechanical transient
commercial software simulator that is used to simulate the special protection system and
the electric power grid. NS2 is an open source tool discrete event simulator for
communication networks and is used in this research to represent the increased bandwidth
of an Internet-like smart grid utility intranet [41]. The smart grid’s communication
network interconnects multiple node types such as, control centers, power generation
plants, substations and customers [41]. Figure 3.1 is an abstract representation of the
smart grid’s communication network. Within NS2, a software agent node represents each
node type. In a real world implementation, these software agent nodes would reside inside
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) or smart Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). In this
simulation environment, the software agent nodes communicate with each other via NS2
and with their corresponding PSS/E power simulator component via EPOCHS [41], [57].
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corresponding power simulator component via EPOCHS [68], see Figure 27. Each 
software agent represents a single power simulator component, such as a load bus in 
PSS/E [65] or a power bus in PSCAD [66]. Each software agent can access and modify 
their corresponding power component’s data (e.g., access sensor data, engage relays, 
change load power levels, etc). The software agents’ capabilities enable seamless 
integration of the trust management toolkit modules with a simulated smart grid enhanced 
power grid. 
 
Figure 26. Abstract representation of a smart grid wide area network [68] 
 
Figure 27. The EPOCHS simulation system [68] 
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Figure 3.1: Abstract representation of a smart grid wide area network [57]
EPOCHS is a combined simulation system that federates the PSS/E
electromechanical transient simulator, as well as other electromagnetic transient
simulators, and the NS2 communication network simulator [57]. Figure 3.2 is a graphical
representation of the EPOCHS simulation system. EPOCHS works via an Agent
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Headquarters (AgentHQ) and a run-time infrastructure (RTI) as shown in Figure 3.2 to
synchronize and coordinate the simulators that would otherwise run at different speeds
[58]. The AgentHQ presents a unified environment to agents and acts as a proxy when
agents interact with other EPOCHS components [57]. The RTI acts as the ”glue” that
links all other components and is responsible for the simulation synchronization as well as
the routing communication between EPOCHS’ components [57].
PSCAD/EMTD
PSS/E
NS2
Agent HQ 
Unified View
Agent
Agent
Agent
Custom Module
Federated Communication
Combined System
Simulators
Legend
Figure 3.2: The EPOCHS simulation system [57]
Within EPOCHS, there are three specific agent type nodes. These include control,
load and generator agents that correspond to their specific PSS/E power simulator
components. There is one control agent node, 30 load agent nodes and 50 generator agent
nodes utilized in this scenario. Each of these agent nodes have the ability to directly
access and modify their corresponding power simulator component’s data and to perform
power grid related actions such as supervisory control and data acquisition through the
communications network. This communications network is a 100 Mega bits per second
(Mbps) capacity network which represents the minimum expected capacity for future
Internet-like smart grids.
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3.4 Research Scenario
This research scenario utilizes the modified version of the IEEE 50 generator / 145
bus power flow test case within PSS/E to demonstrate the benefits of using a con-resistant
trust mechanism along with a special protection system. Modifications include modifying
generator behaviors, the addition of a 500-kV transmission line, and a reduction of total
system capacity [57]. As documented in [57], this test case was modified so that it is more
representative of power systems that would require a special protection system
mechanism.
The special protection system in this scenario monitors the power grid’s frequency
for system disturbances that are indicative of imminent fault and attempts to prevent the
fault by using two of the most common types of special protection system schemes,
namely, generation rejection and load shedding [40]. Recall from Chapter 2 that
generation rejection at an appropriate location in the system reduces power to be
transferred over the critical transmission interfaces [39]. Additionally, load shedding
schemes are employed to reduce the connected load to a level that can be safely supplied
by available generation [39].
The scenario starts out with two high capacity transmission lines down resulting in a
transiently unstable power grid requiring action from a special protection system.
Generator 93 was preselected by SCADA operators for power generation rejection and
commanded to trip or go offline by the special protection system. Contingencies resulting
from tripping of generators cause an imbalance between generation and load [59].
Depending on the percentage of power loss over total production, the frequency will reach
low values. When this happens, other generating units can trip resulting in cascading
events leading to power system blackouts unless additional special protection system
actions are taken [59]. In this scenario, if the nominal 60 Hz system frequency falls below
58.8 Hz, then the special protection system has failed. As utilized in previous research
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[41] [57] [60], 58.8 Hz is the chosen preset frequency threshold for this scenario.
Operating below this threshold can cause an increase in generator turbine vibrations
ultimately damaging the generator causing it to fail [39].
The additional special protection system action taken in this scenario is load
shedding. The goal of the special protection system in this research is to shed enough load
to keep the system’s frequency above a preset level following a system disturbance such as
generation loss [57]. In order to do this, the special protection system used in EPOCHS
uses an algorithm to estimate this system’s disturbance size and the amount of load
shedding required in order to maintain system frequency above 58.8 Hz [57]. This
algorithm can be seen in Equation 3.1
Pd = Pa + ∆Pe(w0+ − w0−, v0+ − v0−) (3.1)
Equation 3.1 shows that the size of the disturbance, Pd, is equal to the system
accelerating power, Pa, which is proportionate to the change in the system’s
frequency, plus the change in electrical power demand ∆Pe due to the
variation in frequency and voltage. Pd is the key in determining the amount of
generation that has been lost. It is important to note that 0− and 0+,
respectively, denote the time immediately before and after the disturbance. Pa
and ∆Pe can both be obtained based on wide area measurements using the
generators operating status and samples of the systems frequency before and
after the disturbance, but measurements must be simultaneously taken at
points throughout the region. [57].
SCADA operators have the ability to change the maximum amount of load a node
can shed within the special protection system scheme. Typical load shedding strategies
include shedding 10%, 15%, or 20% of the available load depending on the severity of the
drop in frequency [39], [61]. In this scenario, the maximum load shed amount is set to
20% of the available load for severe drop in system frequency. Once the required load
shed amount is determined, it is imposed on selected load agent nodes. A sorting
algorithm is then used to determine which nodes are selected for load shedding. In the
original special protection system implementation, load agents nodes are sorted based
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upon their available load shed amounts. In the special protection system implemented
with the con-resistant trust mechanism, load agent nodes are sorted by their assigned trust
values and available load shed amounts. The goal or objective is to prevent a power
outage by commanding a minimum number of nodes to load shed a calculated amount of
power resulting in the power grid’s system frequency remaining above 58.8 Hz [57].
3.4.1 Trust Implementation. The trust management system utilized in this research
is primarily derived from the work of Yu and Singh in the field of reputation management
in electronic communities where a electronic community represents a set of interacting
communities or social interactions [48]. The overall goal of this trust implementation is to
avoid interactions with undesirable entities, namely untrusted nodes. The interaction trust
(I-Trust) mechanism consists of functions which calculate and maintain I-Trust values,
based on a particular interaction marker, for each of the agent nodes communicating
within the system. The interaction marker used in this scenario is the reported frequency
level for each agent node. The reported frequency level is compared to the preset
frequency threshold of 58.8 Hz. The I-Trust value is then calculated based upon that
interaction marker. The resulting I-Trust value is then compared to a preset I-Trust value
threshold. Agent nodes with an I-Trust value greater than the I-Trust value threshold are
considered trusted nodes. Agent nodes with an I-Trust value less than or equal to the
I-Trust threshold are considered untrusted nodes. How this I-Trust value is calculated is
presented in the following subsection.
3.4.2 How Trust is Calculated. To enforce the previously described trust
implementation, an I-Trust value is defined below.
• DEFINITION 1: T jx is the trust value assigned by the I-Trust mechanism to node j
for interaction marker x. It is required that −1 < T jx < 1 and T jx is initialized to zero
[48].
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The I-Trust mechanism calculates a trust value for agent node j based upon the
interactions involving agent node j affecting marker x. Positive (good) and negative (bad)
interactions can be defined in terms of game theory as cooperation and defection
(non-cooperation) respectively [49]. An agent node is said to be cooperating when it is
reporting a frequency value above 58.8 Hz. An agent node is said to be defecting when it
is reporting frequency value equal to or below 58.8 Hz. Cooperation interaction by agent
node j generates a positive evidence α and a defection interaction by agent node j
generates a negative evidence β. Thus requires α ≥ 0 and β ≤ 0. Values for α and β can be
either statically or dynamically assigned depending on the environment in which the trust
system is applied. However, trust relationships are such that trust is easy to lose and hard
to gain[48]. This relationship is achieved by requiring that |α| < |β| and is implemented in
DEFINITION 2 below.
• DEFINITION 2: After an interaction, the resultant trust value T ′jx is calculated by
the algorithm presented in Table 3.3 which considers the previous trust value T jx
[48].
Table 3.3: Simple Interaction Trust Algorithm [46], [48]
T jx Cooperation Interaction by j Defection Interaction by j
> 0 T ′jx = T jx + α(1 − T jx) T
′
jx =
T jx + β
1 − min(|T jx|, |β|)
< 0 T ′jx =
T jx + α
1 − min(|T jx|, |α|)
T ′jx = T jx + β(1 + T jx)
= 0 α β
Table 3.3 presents the equations used for calculating the I-Trust values and is referred
to as the Simple Interaction Trust Algorithm [46], [48]. In [49], Abari and White tested
this algorithm against a confidence attack. As previously stated in Chapter 2 Section 2.7.2,
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a confidence attack is based on a sequence of interactions where a con-man entity
conducts a series of consecutive cooperative interactions in an attempt to gain the
confidence of the system thus elevating its associated trust value. Then at a particular
point in time, the con-man will defect, defrauding the victim. The con-man then has two
choices: 1) never interact with the victim again or 2) regain the lost trust with subsequent
cooperative behavior. The con-man, by regaining the victim’s trust, can again con (or
defect) the victim [49]. This results in a net benefit to the con-man.
Initial results of the simple interaction trust value calculation tested against a
confidence attack are presented in Figure 3.3. A series of simulations were conducted in
which a trust-aware agent using the simple interaction trust algorithm in Table 3.3
interacts with a con-man agent utilizing a Simple Con-man Attack (SCA) pattern of Θ
[46],[49]. Θ is defined as the number of times a node j cooperatively interacts before a
single defection. This Simple Con-man Attack (SCA(Θ)) pattern was repeated for 250
individual interactions.
Figure 3.3 displays the calculated I-Trust values for each attack pattern over a range
of 250 interactions. As defined in DEFINITION 1 above, the interaction trust value, T jx
has an initial value of zero. The values of α and β were set to 0.05 and −0.5 respectively.
In this test conservative values for α and β were set so that trust builds up slowly and is
reduced quickly. Even though the negative penalty for a defection, β, is set to ten times the
positive reward for a cooperation, α, a con-man choosing a Θ > 10 is known as
trustworthy in this particular trust model and depicted in Figure 3.3 [49].
To make the simple interaction trust algorithm proposed by Yu and Singh [48]
resistant to a con-man attack, Abari and White proposed implementing the following
characteristics [49]:
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Figure 3 Simple Trust Value Graph During Confidence Attack 
 
Figure 3 displays a graph of calculated I-Trust values throughout four different con 
man attack patterns.  The interaction trust values for each attack pattern begin at the 
initialized value of zero.  The interaction trust values for each pattern increase with the 
initial cooperation interactions and subsequently drop at the first defection interaction.  
For SCA(5) the interaction trust value reaches 0.23 before the first defection interaction, 
which results in an interaction trust value of -0.35.  With SCA(20), 20 cooperation 
interactions are calculated before the initial defection interaction is processed.  The 
interaction trust value for SCA(20) before the initial defection interaction is 0.64 and is 
0.28 after.  Figure 3 shows the simple interaction trust value can converge to a high value 
with extended intervals between defection interactions [45]. 
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Figure 3.3: Simple I-Trust Value During Confidence Attack [46], [49]
• Cautiously increment trust after defection: The more the agent perceives
defection, the corresponding trust value should be increased more slowly by
perceiving the consecutive cooperations.
• Larger punishment after each defection: The more the agent perceives defection,
the corresponding trust value should be dropped more sharply by perceiving each
defection.
These characteristics are implemented by dynamically adjusting α and β based upon
agent node interaction. The modified trust value as defined in DEFINITION 3 below.
• DEFINITION 3: α and β are determined for Con-Resistant trust value calculation
by the algorithm in Table 3.4, where C is a constant 0 < C ≤ 1.
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Table 3.4: Con-Resistant Interaction Trust Algorithm [49]
Cooperation Interaction by j Defection Interaction by j
α = min(α + γc(α0 − α), α0)
α = α(1 − |β|)
β = β − γd(1 + β)
γc = 1 − |β| γd = C × |T jx|
Table 3.4 presents the equations used to calculate the con-resistant interaction trust
(I-Trust) values and is an extension of Yu and Singh’s simple interaction trust algorithm.
This extension is referred to as the con-resistant interaction trust algorithm [46], [49].
Here, α is the positive reward for cooperation and β is the negative punishment for
defection just like in the simple interaction trust algorithm. However, a defection will
decrease α and will increase the absolute value of β based on the characteristics listed
above. Additionally, these characteristics are motivated by the fact that forgiveness is
slower when several defections have happened, and punishments are bigger for those who
defect more [49].
The con-resistant trust algorithm introduces additional variables in it’s I-Trust value
calculation. The initial value for α is preserved as α0. Based on the equations presented in
Table 3.4, α will increase for each cooperation however it will never exceed α0 [49].
Furthermore, α is decreased at the rate of 1 − |β| which results in a large decrement for α
for a high value of |β| and a small decrement of α for a low value of |β| [49]. Additionally,
discounting factors, γd and γc as well as a constant, C, are introduced. γd is the
discounting factor for a defection and is proportional to the absolute value of the previous
I-Trust value, T jx. The authors hypothesized that the discounting factor, γd, should be high
when the target agent’s I-Trust value is close to 1 (trustworthy) or −1 (untrustworthy)
which is motivated by the fact ”Trust is hard to earn but easy to lose” [49]. Furthermore,
the authors believe that if an agent has a high value of β because of previous defections, its
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α value should be increased more slowly when it is cooperating, thus γc should decrease
as the magnitude of β increases [49].
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Figure 4 is a plot containing the basic test results of the extended I-Trust algorithm 
during a confidence attack.  The interaction patterns used in this initial evaluation of the 
extended I-Trust algorithm are the same as those used for the simple I-Trust algorithm 
shown in Figure 3.  Figure 4 shows the I-Trust values are more severely impacted by 
defection activity and none of the interaction patterns converge to a high trust value.  The 
extended interaction trust algorithm may be suitable for interactions which provide 
benefit to malicious entities for repeated abuse. 
 
 
Figure 4 Extended Trust Value Graph During Confidence Attack 
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Figure 3.4: Con-Resistant I-Trust Value During Confidence Attack [46], [49]
Figure 3.4 displays the results from testing the con-resistant trust calculation against
a confidence attack over a period of interactions. Simulations were run utilizing the same
basic settings as previously described for the simple interaction trust calculation during a
confidence attack as shown in Figure 3.3. Initial values for α and β (α0 and β0) were set to
0.05 and −0.5 respectively. Figure 3.4 shows that regardless of the value of Θ for a Simple
Con-man Attack (SCA(Θ)) pattern, the con-man was recognized by the trust mechanism
and converged to a low value of trust within 150 interactions [49]. Unlike the simple
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interaction trust values, the con-resistant trust values are more severely impacted by the
defection activity and none of the interaction patterns converge to a high trust value [46].
In order for the con-man to con the trust-aware agent, it would take a large number of
cooperations and a change in its pattern of interactions [49].
3.4.3 Abuse Case. The abuse case used in this scenario is based upon the special
protection system’s ability to detect untrusted agent node behavior during system updates.
Each simulation starts at time zero and runs for 50 seconds to ensure that the power
system has stabilized. Throughout the simulation, the special protection system’s control
agent node receives updates from load and generator agent nodes every two milliseconds.
These updates include the load agent nodes current operating frequency level.
Additionally, the con-resistant trust mechanism calculates and reports the I-Trust values
during each interaction (time step). At time 0.18 seconds, generator 93 is commanded to
trip and at time 0.184 seconds it goes offline. Four milliseconds later at time 0.192
seconds, the special protection system makes the determination of which load agent nodes
are trusted and untrusted. Success is determined by the special protection system’s ability
to accurately identify which load agent nodes are trusted and untrusted and it’s ability to
select the minimum number of optimal trusted nodes to shed load in an attempt to keep
the system’s steady-state frequency above 58.8 Hz. Conversely, if the special protection
system selects and untrusted node to shed load, the untrusted node will not shed load
causing the system steady-state frequency to fall below the 58.8 Hz threshold.
3.5 Performance Metrics
The primary metric used to evaluate the performance of the special protection system
implemented with and without the con-resistant trust mechanism is the system frequency.
The critical system frequency threshold is 58.8 Hz. Operating below this threshold can
cause an increase in generator turbine vibrations ultimately damaging the generator
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causing it to fail potentially leading to cascading events such as power system blackouts
[39].
3.6 System Parameters
Systems parameters are characteristics of the system, that if changed will affect the
performance of the special protection system implemented with a con-resistant trust
mechanism. These parameters include the following:
• Frequency tolerance
• α value
• β value
• Constant, C
In Fadul’s enhanced Special Protection Protection System with the Reputation-based
Trust Management Toolkit [41], untrusted nodes were designated by subtracting a fixed
value or tolerance from the reported frequency level. In this research, the tolerance value
is randomized to simulate realistic fluctuations in frequency due to inherent noise.
The α and β values chosen in Abari and White’s extension of the simple interaction
trust algorithm were based on a 1 to 10 penalty ratio for cooperative to defective
interactions [49]. Specifically, they choose 0.05 and −0.5 respectively for cooperation (α)
and defection (β). Hundreds of interactions occur before a trust determination is made. In
this research, a 1 to 3 penalty ratio is utilized for the cooperative and defective interactions,
specifically 0.15 for α and −0.45 for β. Unlike previous research, this research requires a
trust determination within 17 interactions (time steps). In the special protection system,
there is not enough time to recover from a such a large defection penalty.
Finally, the constant C, is utilized as a multiple for calculating the defection
discounting factor, γd, as seen in Table 3.4. In previous research [49], C is a value between
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zero and one in which the authors chose 1e . In this research, C = 0.3679 which is
equivalent to 1e .
3.7 Evaluation Technique
Performance evaluation of the special protection system implemented with a
con-resistant trust mechanism using simulations is the chosen evaluation technique for
this research. Additionally, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and a comparison of
confidence intervals via the open source R statistical package [62] [63] is the analysis
procedure used to determine the statistical significance of the simulation results. An
ANOVA is a statistical procedure that can be used to test the hypothesis that whether or
not the means among two or more groups are equal, under the assumption that the
sampled populations are normally distributed [64].
3.8 Experimental Design
To evaluate the interaction between all factors and to ensure every factor level
combination is considered, a full factorial design is used. The special protection system
experiments have two factors: 1) number of untrusted nodes and 2) whether the special
protection system utilizes the con-resistant trust mechanism or it doesn’t. There are three
treatment levels of untrusted nodes: five, ten, or fifteen. The full factorial design requires
three levels by two (3 × 2) factors which results in a total of six experiments. Each
experiment is then replicated 36 times for a total of 216 simulations.
The research utilizes NS2’s predefined 64 good random seed values in the rng.cc file
for computer simulation experiments [65]. These random seed values are equally spaced
around a 231 cycle of random numbers, where each seed value is approximately
33,000,000 elements apart from each other. The seeds are selected from the rng.cc file to
match past research and to aid a more direct comparison of simulation results with each
replication of the experiment utilizing a unique seed. Thirty six of these seed values are
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used for data collection in each test case configuration. Additionally, the seeds are used to
select the untrusted nodes in each simulation. The data collected during each observation
is the minimum power grid system frequency. This frequency data is then analyzed and
interpreted to evaluate the effectiveness of the con-resistant trust mechanism.
Frequency data from the ”Original SPS test case with 5 untrusted nodes” is used to
determine the data’s normality. Figure 3.5 is a histogram plot of the collected frequency
data. Histograms are graphics commonly used to display data distributions for quantitative
variables [66]. The histogram in Figure 3.5 graphically reveals the qualities of a normal
bell curve and visually suggests that the sampled data collected are from a normally
distributed population.
An additional plot to visually confirm that the sampled data is from a normally
distributed population is a normal quantile plot. This normal quantile plot of the collected
data is depicted in Figure 3.6. A normal quantile plot (also called a normal probability
plot) is a specialized type of graphic that is used to determine whether or not data for a
variable are normally distributed [66]. When the sample data value points in the normal
quantile plot lie close to a straight line with a slope of one, this indicates that the data are
normally distributed [66]. Figure 3.6 suggests that the sample data is being drawn from a
normally distributed population since the sample data lands very close to the line
representing the theoretical normal distribution for the sample data.
To statistically support that the sampled data are from a normal distribution, a
Shapiro-Wilk normality test [67] is conducted. The Shapiro-Wilk normality statistic tests
the null hypothesis that the sample data came from a normally distributed population [67].
The null hypothesis is that the population is normally distributed. If the p-value is less
than the chosen alpha value, then the null hypothesis is rejected (i.e. the data are not from
a normally distributed population). If the p-value is greater than the chosen alpha value,
then the null hypothesis is accepted (i.e. the data are from a normally distributed
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Figure 3.5: Histogram for original SPS and 5 untrusted nodes
population). The selected confidence interval level of 95% corresponds to a statistical
alpha value of 5%. A Shapiro-Wilk normality test confirms the normal distribution of the
sampled data with a p-value of 0.5614 and a W value of 0.9745. The W value of 0.9745 is
close to one and supports the null hypothesis. At the 95% confidence interval, the samples
p-value greater than 0.05 results in the overall acceptance of the null hypothesis.
3.9 Summary
This chapter presented the methodology used to evaluate the application of a
con-resistant trust mechanism with a special protection system for the smart grid. The
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Figure 3.6: Normal quantile plot for original SPS and 5 untrusted nodes
chapter began by identifying research goals and the hypothesis. Next, the simulation
environment was discussed followed by a detailed explanation of the research scenario to
include the con-resistant trust implementation, how the con-resistant interaction trust
(I-Trust) value is calculated, and the abuse case used. Additionally, the primary
performance metric, system parameters, and the evaluation technique used to determine
statistical significance of the simulation results within a 95% confidence interval are
identified. Finally, an explanation of the experimental design was presented along with the
validation of determining the sampled data are from a normally distributed population.
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4 Results
4.1 Overview
This chapter presents the results from experimental simulations and an analysis of the
results from implementing special protection system with a con-resistant trust mechanism
for the communications-based smart grid utility network. First, results from con-resistant
trust mechanism implementation at each of the three treatment levels of five, ten, and
fifteen untrusted nodes are presented. Additionally, individual interactions of untrusted
protection system nodes are analyzed for each of the three treatment levels. Finally, the
chapter concludes with an overall analysis of the results to include a comparison of the
research treatments as well as addressing the investigative questions introduced in Chapter
1.
4.2 Experimental Results
The primary goal of this research is to demonstrate that a special protection system
implemented with con-resistant trust mechanism can successfully function in the presence
of untrusted (malicious or malfunctioning) smart grid special protection system nodes.
Success is determined by the special protection systems ability to accurately identify
which load agent nodes are trusted and untrusted and its ability to select the minimum
number of optimal trusted nodes to shed load in an attempt to keep the systems
steady-state frequency above 58.8 Hz. Table 3.2 provided an example of how nodes are
sorted and selected for load shedding.
Simulation results support the use of a special protection system implemented with a
con-resistant trust mechanism for the communications-based smart grid over the use of a
traditional special protection systems. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show frequency levels of the
original special protection system without any trust implementation and the special
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protection system implemented with the con-resistant trust mechanism respectively during
simulations. Results depicted in Figure 4.2 demonstrate that the special protection system
implemented with the con-resistant trust mechanism can successfully keep the system’s
steady state frequency above the 58.8 HZ whereas the original special protection system
without any trust implementation depicted in Figure 4.1 does not.
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Figure 4.1: Original SPS is unable to keep the systems’s frequency above 58.8 Hz
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Figure 4.2: SPS implemented with con-resistant trust does keep the system’s frequency
above 58.8 Hz
49
As previously stated in section 3.7 of Chapter 3, the special protection system
experiments have two factors and three treatment levels. The factors are the number of
untrusted nodes and whether or not the special protection system utilizes the con-resistant
trust mechanism. The three treatment levels are five, ten, and fifteen untrusted nodes.
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Figure 4.3: Mean con-resistant trust results with 5 untrusted nodes
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 represent the mean con-resistant interaction trust (I-Trust)
values as determined by the special protection system con-resistant trust mechanism
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Figure 4.4: Mean con-resistant trust results with 10 untrusted nodes
during 36 simulation runs for each of the 3 treatment levels. At time 0.180 seconds,
Generator 93 is commanded to trip. At time 0.184 seconds, Generator 93 goes offline. At
time 0.192 seconds, the special protection system makes the determination of which load
agent nodes are trusted and untrusted. The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.
The special protection system implemented with the con-resistant trust mechanism is
tuned to minimize the possibility of identifying unreliable nodes as trusted. Several
experiments were conducted to corroborate this behavior. Empirical data showed that the
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Figure 4.5: Mean con-resistant trust results with 15 untrusted nodes
mean error associated with a 95% confidence interval for the trusted nodes is negligible
(< 0.0027). From this, it is evident that the system is capable of identifying nodes that
exhibit cooperative behaviors with a high degree of certainty. However, it is possible for
the trust mechanism to classify a node with cooperative behavior as untrusted for a short
interval, if its frequency reading deviates significantly from the mean frequency of all
nodes. For this reason, the error associated with untrusted node determination is greater
than the trusted node determination.
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Figure 4.3 shows that the error associated with a 95% confidence interval for five
untrusted nodes increases over the course of the simulation run time. The larger error
signifies a presence of false negatives, i.e. a reliable node reporting as untrusted. However,
at time 0.192 seconds, when the final trust determination is made, the high and low
interaction trust (I-Trust) values representing a 95% confidence interval for the five
untrusted node experiment are −0.20614 and −0.66014 respectively. These values fall
well below the trust threshold set by Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
operators and would not be selected by the special protection system for load shedding.
As the number of untrusted nodes increase, the number of false negatives decreases.
This is evident with the ten and fifteen untrusted node experiments depicted in Figures 4.4
and 4.5 respectively. The high and low I-Trust values representing a 95% confidence
interval for ten untrusted nodes at time 0.192 seconds are −0.74631 and −1.01031.
Similarly, the high and low I-Trust values representing a 95% confidence intervals for
fifteen untrusted nodes at time 0.192 seconds are −0.916 and −1.018. In both cases, the
I-Trust values fall well below the trust threshold set by Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) operators and would not be selected by the special protection
system for load shedding.
Figure 4.6 depicts the individual cooperative and defective interactions of five
untrusted nodes as determined by the special protection system con-resistant trust
mechanism during one simulation run. Here, the untrusted nodes interaction trust (I-Trust)
values are severely impacted by the defection activity. Four out of the five (or 80%) of the
untrusted nodes exhibited cooperative behaviors; however, none of the untrusted nodes’
interaction patterns converged to a high I-Trust value. In order for a untrusted node to be
trusted, it would take a significant number of cooperations and a considerable amount of
time. However, due to the strict timing constraints of Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems and the smart grid, special protection system decisions
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Figure 4.6: Individual cooperative and defective interactions for 5 untrusted nodes during
one simulation run
have to be made quickly in order to prevent additional transient instabilities that could
result in cascading power outages.
Figure 4.7 depicts the individual cooperative and defective interactions of ten
untrusted nodes as determined by the special protection system con-resistant trust
mechanism during one simulation run. As with the five untrusted node interactions case,
the ten untrusted nodes interaction trust (I-Trust) values are also severely impacted by the
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Figure 4.7: Individual cooperative and defective interactions for 10 untrusted nodes during
one simulation run
defection activity. In this simulation, 90% of the untrusted nodes exhibit cooperative
behaviors. Just as in the five individual untrusted node interactions, none of the ten
untrusted nodes converge to a high I-Trust value. At the point in the simulation when the
final trust determination is made, all of the untrusted nodes converge to a −1.0 I-Trust
value.
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Figure 4.8: Individual cooperative and defective interactions for 15 untrusted nodes during
one simulation run
Figure 4.8 depicts the individual cooperative and defective interactions of fifteen
untrusted nodes as determined by the special protection system con-resistant trust
mechanism during one simulation run. As with the five and ten untrusted node interaction
cases, the fifteen untrusted nodes interaction trust (I-Trust) values are also severely
impacted by the defection activity. In this simulation, 93.3% of the untrusted nodes
exhibit cooperative behaviors. Just as in the five and ten individual untrusted node
interaction cases, none of the fifteen untrusted nodes converge to a high I-Trust value. At
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the point in the simulation when the final trust determination is made, all of the untrusted
nodes converge to a −1.0 I-Trust value.
4.3 Overall Analysis
Comparison of the experiments conducted at each of the treatment levels, for each
factor, are presented in Figure 4.9. Each bar plot represents the mean steady state
frequency reported at the end of each simulation run. The error bars represent a 95%
confidence interval. The graphical results in Figure 4.9 are presented as an Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) where the variance about the mean values is represented by 95%
confidence intervals. The non-overlapping confidence intervals illustrate a statistically
significant difference between the original special protection system without any trust
mechanism and the special protection system implemented with the con-resistant trust
mechanism.
Table 4.1: ANOVA numerical calculation results between SPS with no trust and SPS with
con-resistant trust
Analysis of Variance Table 
 
Response: Frequency 
                  Df Sum Sq Mean Sq  F value    Pr(>F)     
Treatment          1 6.9154  6.9154 1069.523 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Levels             2 1.2876  0.6438   99.572 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Treatment:Levels   2 1.1653  0.5827   90.114 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Residuals        210 1.3578  0.0065                        
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
The ANOVA numerical calculations were performed using the R statistical package
[62], [63]. These calculation results are shown in Table 4.1 and indicate a significant
statistical difference between the two factors (with and without trust mechanism). The
p-value, Pr(>F), is less than 2.2x10−16, which is smaller than an alpha value of 0.05
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of test treatments with 5, 10 and 15 untrusted nodes
associated with a 95%confidence interval. The small p-value is convincing evidence of a
statistical difference between the two factors.
Figure 4.10 shows the comparison of trust implementations conducted at each of the
treatment levels, including the original special protection system without any trust
implementation, the special protection system implemented with the majority-rules
reputation-based trust from previous research [41] and the special protection system
implemented with con-resistant trust utilized in this research. Each bar plot represents the
mean steady state frequency reported at the end of each simulation run. The error bars
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Figure 4.10: Previous research comparison of test treatments with 5, 10 and 15 untrusted
nodes [41]
represent a 95% confidence interval. A visual analysis between the two trust
implementations shows that the special protection system implemented with either the
majority-rules reputation-based trust or the con-resistant trust is able to successfully keep
the system’s steady state frequency above 58.8 Hz across all three treatment levels.
Results from an ANOVA analysis shown in Table 4.2 indicate a statistical difference
between the special protection system implemented with con-resistant trust and the special
protection system implemented with reputation-based trust from previous research [41].
The ANOVA calculations were performed using the R statistical package [62], [63].
59
Table 4.2: ANOVA numerical calculation results between SPS with reputation-based trust
and SPS with con-resistant trust
Analysis of Variance Table 
 
Response: Frequency 
                  Df  Sum Sq  Mean Sq F value    Pr(>F)     
Treatment          1 0.06463 0.064630 13.9985 0.0002361 *** 
Levels             2 0.06820 0.034099  7.3856 0.0007948 *** 
Treatment:Levels   2 0.03993 0.019964  4.3240 0.0144454 *   
Residuals        210 0.96955 0.004617                       
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Results from the ANOVA analysis show that the p-value, Pr(>F), is approximately 0.0002,
which is smaller than an alpha value of 0.05 associated with a 95% confidence interval.
The small p-value is convincing evidence of a statistical difference between the special
protection system implemented with con-resistant trust and the special protection system
implemented with reputation-based trust from previous research [41].
Furthermore, R’s pairwise t.test was conducted between treatments levels to
determine were the difference lies [62], [63]. Results from the pairwise t.test indicate a
significant statistical difference between 5 and 15 untrusted nodes with an associated
p-value of 0.0004 and the 10 and 15 untrusted nodes with an associated p-value of 0.0123.
These p-values are smaller than an alpha value of 0.05 associated with a 95% confidence
interval which is convincing evidence of a statistical difference between the 5 and 15
untrusted nodes as well as the 10 and 15 untrusted nodes. Additionally, the pairwise t.test
results also indicated no statistical difference between 5 and 10 untrusted nodes in which
the associated p-value was 0.29361.
4.3.1 Investigative Questions Answered. The analysis of this research indicates
that a special protection system implemented with the con-resistant trust mechanism can
successfully determine and execute the appropriate load shedding strategy in the presence
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of untrusted (malicious or malfunctioning) protection system agent nodes during system
wide disturbances. Additionally, over all the experiments, the special protection system
implemented with con-resistant trust mechanism was able to successfully keep the
system’s steady state frequency above the 58.8 Hz threshold. Furthermore, the special
protection system implemented with the con-resistant trust mechanism out performs the
special protection system implemented with a majority-rules reputation-based Trust
Management Toolkit at the 10 and 15 untrusted node levels.
4.4 Summary
This chapter provided the results from experimental simulations and an analysis of
the results from implementing Sspecial protection system with a con-resistant trust
mechanism for the communications-based smart grid utility network. First, the research
analyzed if the two different test factors were able to successfully keep the system
steady-state frequency above the 58.8 Hz threshold. Next, the research examined the
simulation results from the special protection system implemented with the con-resistant
trust mechanism at each of the three treatment levels. Additionally, individual interactions
of untrusted nodes were presented and analyzed to demonstrate the cooperative and
defective interaction behaviors. Finally, the chapter concluded with an overall analysis to
determine the statistical significance of simulation results via an Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) and also addressed investigative questions introduced in Chapter 1. Simulation
results supported the use of a special protection system implemented with a con-resistant
trust mechanism for the smart grid over the use of a traditional special protection systems.
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5 Conclusion
5.1 Overview
This chapter summarizes the overall conclusions of the research. First, it reviews the
primary goals and results from this research effort to implement a con-resistant trust
mechanism within the special protection system for the communications-based smart grid.
Next, the significance of this research is discussed. Finally, recommendations for future
work is presented.
5.2 Conclusions of Research
The primary goal of this research was to demonstrate that a special protection system
implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism can successfully function in the
presence of untrusted (malicious or malfunctioning) smart grid special protection system
nodes by implementing appropriate load shedding strategies to mitigate transient
instabilities that can occur. Success was determined by the special protection systems
ability to accurately identify which load agent nodes are trusted and untrusted and its
ability to select the minimum number of optimal trusted nodes to shed load in an attempt
to keep the systems steady-state frequency above 58.8 Hz. Simulation results support the
use of an special protection system implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism for
the smart grid over the use of a traditional special protection systems. Results showed that
the special protection system implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism was able
to successfully keep the system’s steady state frequency above the 58.8 Hz threshold.
Additionally, the special protection system implemented with a con-resistant trust
mechanism successfully identified nodes that exhibit cooperative behaviors as trusted and
nodes that exhibited defective behaviors as untrusted with a high degree of certainty.
Finally, the overall statistical analysis of experiments conducted at each of the treatment
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levels, for each factor, suggests a statistically significant difference between the two
systems and supports the use of an special protection system implemented with the
con-resistant trust mechanism versus an special protection system without the
con-resistant trust mechanism.
5.3 Significance of Research
This research presented an alternate application of trust for special protection
systems within a communications-based smart grid. While similar to previous research
[41] utilizing majority-rules reputation-based trust, certain experimental parameters were
changed to provide a more realistic research scenario. The results of this research
demonstrates the successful functioning of a special protection system, implemented with
a con-resistant trust mechanism, in the presence of untrusted (malicious or
malfunctioning) smart grid special protection system nodes. Furthermore, the research
demonstrated that, in this particular scenario, using this specific simulation environment,
the special protection system implemented with the con-resistant trust mechanism works.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Work
This research consisted of an effort to apply an alternate application of trust to
communications-based special protection systems for the smart grid. Trust, as it relates to
special protection systems, can be extended in several ways. Recommendations for future
work include the following:
• Implement additional abuses cases to test the robustness of the special protection
system implemented with a con-resistant trust mechanism
• Incorporate a multi-trust mechanism approach to make a single trust decision about
an entity regarding a complex trust relationship [47]
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• Implement a context sensitive model of trust by formalizing the relationships
between contexts to extrapolate values from related contexts to approximate the
trust of an entity, even when all information needed to calculate the trust is not
available [43]
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